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ABSTRACT
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education shows the evolution of
the role of the three branches in enforcing the equal protection clause in
public education in Alabama. All three branches initially acquiesced in
the separate but equal doctrine. The executive and the judicial branches
rejected the doctrine in Brown, but the legislative branch remained silent
until 1964. Despite Congress’ failure to authorize a federal role in
desegregation, the Department of Justice was an active participant in Lee
beginning in 1963. When Congress finally did act in 1964 to authorize
such suits, it encumbered the authorization with severe limitations.
Congress also created a parallel enforcement mechanism, in Title VI of
the 1964 Act. In later years, Congress and the executive have emphasized
general reform of education as the answer, in legislation such as No Child
Left Behind. My paper explores the role of the federal government in the
statewide desegregation of Alabama’s public schools. Federal court
litigation in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education led to an
extraordinary remedy and illustrates the potential for the Departments
of Justice and Education to play a key role in reviving the quest for equal
educational opportunity through desegregation.
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ARTICLE
“[T]here is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success,
nor more dangerous than the creation of a new system.”1
“He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time
is the greatest innovator.”2
During my twenty two years (1964 to 1986) as a trial and appellate
lawyer in the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice (“the Division”), the Division treated school desegregation as a
priority issue. Today, by contrast, school desegregation has almost
disappeared as a goal, reflecting “the limited focus education receives
as a civil rights issue these days.”3
School desegregation, once considered the key to equal educational
opportunity, is embattled. From one side, critics say that desegregation
has accomplished little, pointing out that 38% of black students attend
schools that enroll very few white students.4 Other critics challenge the
very premise of desegregation, which, they claim, has destroyed a
valuable institution in the African-American community, the all-black
school.5 Critics of Brown v. Board of Education6 (Brown) have ranged
from arguing it is poorly reasoned to suggesting it unrealistically sought
more change than society would tolerate.7 Revisionism is rampant. The
Supreme Court has placed major obstacles in the way of race-based
1. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 15 (Appleton-Century Crofts Inc. 1947).
2. FRANCIS BACON, BACON’S ESSAYS: WITH ANNOTATIONS 248 (Richard Whately, ed.
1858).
3. Michael Selmi, The Obama Administration’s Civil Rights Record: The Difference an
Administration Makes, 2 INDIANA J. OF L. & SOC. EQUALITY 108, 117 (2013).
4. E Pluribus . . . Separation, Gary Orfield, John Kucsera, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley,
THE C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES (September 2012), http://civilrights
project.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/epluribus. . .separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus
_revised_omplete_2012.pdf. The statistical picture is complex, but some of the racial isolation may
stem from declarations of unitary status. Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local
Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L.& ECON. REV. 347, 381–
82 (2006). But see U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights., Becoming Less Separate? School Desegregation,
Justice Department Enforcement, and the Pursuit of Unitary Status xii (2007) [hereinafter
Becoming Less Separate?]. Neither Clotfelter’s nor the Commission’s research reflects the effect
of the Louisville decision, which rolls back desegregation in districts that have been declared
unitary. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
5. Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: Black Teachers and School Integration, 91 J. OF
AM. HIST. 43, 44, (June 2004) http://www.umass.edu/legal/Hilbink/250/Adam%20Fairclough
%20-%20The%20Costs%20of%20Brown.pdf.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown].
7. See Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L.
REV. 7, 11 (1994) (noting that rather than immediately causing desegregation, Brown acted to
crystallize white resistance to the Civil Rights Movement in the South).
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efforts to desegregate school systems and has adopted rules that allow
school systems that had desegregated to resegregate their schools.8
Fifty years ago, the federal government supported private plaintiffs
in a landmark case that desegregated ninety-nine school systems in
Alabama, Lee v. Macon County Board of Education (Lee).9 The
government’s experience litigating Lee suggests that the U.S.
Departments of Justice and of Education could play a key role in
reviving the quest for school desegregation. These departments
successfully supported private plaintiffs seeking school desegregation
throughout Alabama. A similar partnership is needed today to reverse
increased racial isolation in the public schools.
The core, foundational civil rights issues for African-Americans
have been voting and education—both prerequisites to employment,
housing, fair law enforcement, and political equality. Voting rights seem
at a standstill, while the right to an equal education through
desegregation has given way to acceptance of retrogression.10 The civil
rights community is mounting an impressive attack on erosion of voting
rights, but has been much less aggressive when it comes to attacking
racial isolation in our public schools. Civil rights supporters need to
formulate a strategy for responding to the Supreme Court’s retrograde
school desegregation decisions, as they have with respect to the Court’s
decision rolling back the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v.
Holder.11
The strategy must be long-term. It should include building a judicial
record of the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of inclusion. It
should also opportunistically address what we can expect each branch
of the federal government to do to reduce racial isolation in the public
schools. This paper concludes that the most promising course may be

8. See Charles J. Ogletree Jr. and Susan Eaton, From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville:
Is “All Deliberate Speed” Stuck in Reverse?, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279 (2008); Bd. of
Educ. of Okla. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240 (1991); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at
709.
9. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) [hereinafter Lee].
10. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (striking down the coverage formula
provision of the Voting Rights Act). But see N. C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,
No. 16-1468, 2016 WL 4053033, at *24 (4th Cir. July 29, 2016) and cases consolidated with it
(reversing trial court holding that NC laws restricting voting rights did not violate Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, or other federal laws); Veasey v. Abbott, 815 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016)
(overturning Texas Voter ID law). See also Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992) (allowing unitary systems to reinstate racially isolated student assignments).
11. See generally NAACP Legal Defense Fund, State and Local Voting Changes Post-Shelby,
(2016) (monitoring changes to state voter rights to prevent further civil rights violations).
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to rely on federal enforcement of regulations rather than on private
suits to enforce the Constitution or statutes.
The Radical Republican Congress drew the Fourteenth
Amendment in exceedingly vague terms: states may not deprive
persons within their jurisdiction of “the equal protection of the laws.”12
While Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment arguably would have
allowed Congress to help define the content of equal protection, its
interpretive power today is limited.13 Congress has deferred to the
courts. Prior to Brown, Congress never challenged the separate but
equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson14 (Plessy) through legislation.15 Not
until 1964, ten years after Brown, did Congress take any steps to
enforce Brown.16 As we will see, Brown led courts and the executive
branch to require major restructuring of school systems in order to
eliminate the racial dual school system. Congress continues to lack the
institutional will to enact legislation to reduce racial isolation, so
further change must come from the other branches of the federal
government or from the state and local level.
School desegregation after Brown can be viewed as an example of
Fourteenth Amendment federalism in action. The Fourteenth
Amendment radically restructured the relationship between the
federal and state governments by subjecting states to the due process
and equal protection clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment also
empowered each of the three branches of the federal government to
enforce the equal protection clause. Section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment implicitly imposes on the federal courts the duty to
enforce, if a case is properly brought.17 Section five explicitly tells
Congress that it “shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation” the provisions of the Amendment. While the Amendment
does not mention the role of the executive branch, Article II of the
Constitution requires that the President “shall take care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”18
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) [hereinafter Plessy].
15. See U.S. House of Representatives, Constitutional Amendments and Major Civil Rights
Acts of Congress referenced in BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, http://history.house.gov/
Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Constitutional-Amendments-andLegislation/ (last visited May 5, 2016) (showing the gap in time following Plessy before Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act following Brown) [hereinafter Constitutional Amendments].
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer19 suggested the simplistic
message that the legislature makes policy, the court interprets the law,
and the executive enforces it.20 However, the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was vague, implicitly inviting the three
branches to interpret whether and how it applied to school segregation.
However, the legislature made no policy and left it to the executive and
courts to fill the resultant vacuum and used the Fourteenth
Amendment as a sword, reversing the Madisonian norm that “the
legislative authority necessarily predominates.”21 President Truman
and his successors had policy reasons for wanting to end the official
racial caste system. The Supreme Court took a pragmatic look at the
facts and the underlying policy of the Fourteenth Amendment in
reaching its conclusion that separate was never equal.
The story of Lee illustrates both the federalism and separation of
powers aspects of school desegregation. It also illustrates the operation
of general principles and specific consequences of those principles. In
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress had declared that AfricanAmericans and the Justice Department would no longer have to litigate
voting rights cases county by county.22 In 1967, without encouragement
from Congress, the federal district court in Lee v. Macon County Board
of Education decreed that African-Americans and the Department of
Justice would no longer have to litigate school desegregation cases
school district by school district, and it placed on the state the burden
of showing that the school systems in Alabama were following effective
school desegregation plans.23
The Macon County story from 1963 to 1972 unfolds in four chapters.
Chapter One begins after over eighty percent of the county’s
population was freed from chattel slavery. The State of Alabama,
abetted by the federal government, imposed a racial caste system
designed to preserve the subordinate position of the newly-freed slaves.
In Chapter Two, increasingly assertive Macon County AfricanAmericans, this time with the aid of the federal courts and executive,
overthrow the racial caste system, despite efforts of white state
19. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. See id. at 584–585 (1952) (stating that courts refrain from interpreting constitutional
questions until called to do so, and stating that the President’s power to issue orders must come
from the Constitution or from an act of Congress).
21. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 176
(Mentor ed. 1961).
22. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
23. 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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politicians such as George C. Wallace, to interfere with change. By
Chapter Three, Governor Wallace has over-played his hand, and the
federal executive, this time with Congressional backing, helps Anthony
B. Lee (by then a college graduate) and his lawyer, Fred Gray, obtain a
statewide school desegregation order. Finally, Chapter Four tells the
story of the implementation of the federal court order and of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This article describes the first three
chapters and part of the fourth and then draws lessons from them. It
concludes with a call for a revival of the federal role in seeking to end
the continued racial isolation found in many school systems throughout
the United States.
I. THE RACIAL CASTE SYSTEM, 1870-1954
For over 80 years, Macon County African-Americans endured
separate but unequal education and poverty, and were deprived of the
right to vote. However, the very institutions of separation laid the
foundation for challenges to denials of equal protection of the laws.
In 1870, 17,727 people lived in Macon County, of whom 12,620, 71%,
were classified as “colored.”24 A quarter of the county population lived
in Tuskegee, which would become the site of the Tuskegee Institute
eleven years later. Booker T. Washington raised money for this school
for the newly freed slaves and their descendants, but the State of
Alabama appropriated money for the school from the very start.25 The
pattern of repression of African-Americans in Macon County mirrored
the rest of the deep South, but the Tuskegee Institute’s presence
brought to the county a cadre of highly educated and somewhat
independent thinking African-Americans.
The federal government endorsed racial segregation.26 This
support, ironically, facilitated attacks on segregation, by contributing to
the rise of an independent black middle class that was able to challenge
the racial caste system. In 1923, the Veterans Administration (VA)
opened a hospital for African-American veterans in Tuskegee that was
soon staffed by black doctors, nurses, and staff, including Detroit Lee,
the father of the named plaintiff in Lee. Congress also embraced the
separate but equal doctrine in the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890,
24. Historical Census Browser, Univ. of Virginia Library, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/
[hereinafter Historical Census Browser].
25. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY, 177–95 (Doubleday, Page & Co. 1900)
26. See 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1862) (enacting a law that considered funding for separate institutions
for black students and white students legal).
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extending to the former Confederate States the Morrill Act of 1862,
and specifying that “the legislature of such State may propose and
report to the Secretary of Agriculture a just and equitable division of
the fund to be received under this subchapter between one college for
white students and one institution for colored students . . . .”27 “Thus, six
years prior to Plessy, federal law endorsed the principle of legal
segregation as legitimate social policy with respect to land grant
colleges.”28 Tuskegee Institute became one of the two AfricanAmerican land grant colleges in Alabama.29 The acceptance of racial
segregation by all three branches led to one more dividend for
Tuskegee in 1941, when the War Department established a training
program there for black pilots, who became the famous “Tuskegee
Airmen.”30 These three institutions – the Tuskegee Institute, the VA
Hospital, and the Tuskegee Airmen – employed highly educated people
who were not economically dependent on white employers or property
owners. They became the nucleus that challenged the existing structure
of white supremacy.
Macon County has been called “the guinea pig of race relations in
Alabama.”31 White domination was cemented by ratification of
Alabama’s new constitution in 1901, which barred blacks from
registering to vote as a practical matter.32 Additional legislation, such
as the implementation of a poll tax continued these efforts. 96,000 of
the 100,000 African-Americans registered to vote in Alabama in 1900
had been purged from the rolls by 1910.33 By the 1930s AfricanAmericans in Macon County had become conscious of the importance
of education and of the inequalities in the current education system.
27. Id.
28. ALBERT L. SAMUELS, IS SEPARATE UNEQUAL? BLACK COLLEGES AND THE
CHALLENGE TO DESEGREGATION 37 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2004).
29. Encyclopedia of Alabama, Land Grant Colleges in Alabama, http://www.encyclopedia
ofalabama.org/article/h-1558 (last visited July 30, 2015).
30. ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND 97 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985). In a
more sinister move, the United States executive branch most notoriously lured Macon County
African-American men into a study of the progress of untreated syphilis. The subjects were,
without their knowledge or informed consent, divided into two groups. One group was treated,
while the other group was given a placebo. This Public Health Service study went on from 1932
until finally exposed in the 1970’s. FRED GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 294–302 (Revised Ed.,
2013) See also Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee:
The Tuskeegee Timeline, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
31. See Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court
Power and Social Change in Macon County, Alabama, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 867, 870–871 (2014).
32. Id. at 877.
33. VIRGINIA VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, ALABAMA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 96
(Norton 1977).
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One Macon County parent explained why he was sending his child to
school: “I’m tired of mortgaging my family. That’s just the reason I’m
trying to prepare my little girl.”34 A Macon County minister sermonized
that Paul had improved himself by going to school. Although “Most of
our boys and girls don’t lak ter go ter school . . . . after you git an
education there is a chance fer you, you can git a position.”35 As early
as 1936, the Southern Regional Conference of the N.A.A.C.P., meeting
in Mobile, Alabama, resolved: “We insist that Negro children receive
equal training and educational opportunity in the public school system
and equal university opportunity.”36
In 1940, Macon County had a population of 27,654, of whom 4,946
were white and 22,708, or 82.4%, were black.37 17,288 of blacks lived on
rural farms, compared to 3,332 whites.38 Tuskegee had a total
population of 3,937, comprised of 1,093 whites and 2,844 blacks.39 521
whites and 2,576 blacks lived in the other towns in Macon County,
Shorter and Notasulga.40 Despite the substantial numerical superiority
of blacks in Macon County, whites had successfully denied them
political power. Only 77 blacks were registered to vote.41
Equally troubling was the dramatic difference in quality of
education. White schools stayed open longer, 173 days, compared to 146
days for African-American schools, and featured half the students per
teacher, 23.8 to 50.7.42 In addition, in the 1938-39 year the school system
spent 14.75 times more on white students than on black students in day
school.43 In that same year, there was no ratio for capital expenditures

34. CHARLES SPURGEON JOHNSON, SHADOW OF THE PLANTATION 134 (University of
Chicago Press 1934).
35. Id. at 156.
36. NAACP PAPERS, Box G-1, Folder 1, Resolution Adopted by Southern Regional
Conference of N.A.A.C.P. (Apr. 25–26, 1936). Three years later the Conference once again
pledged support to the NAACP’s campaign “to effect an equalization of educational
opportunities and of teachers’ salaries, and we urge the Branches to initiate test cases in order to
accomplish that objective.” NAACP PAPERS, Box G-1, folder 3, Report of Resolution Committee,
Fourth Southern Regional Conference, (Apr. 21–23, 1939).
37. Historical Census Browser, supra note 24.
38. U.S. CENSUS, Census of Population and Housing, http://www.census.gov/prod/
www/decennial.html.
39. Id.
40. Historical Census Browser, supra note 24.
41. JESSIE PARKHURST GUZMAN, CRUSADE FOR CIVIC DEMOCRACY 3–4 (Vantage Press,
Inc., 1984).
42. Id. at 5.
43. TUSKEGEE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, TRENDS IN SELECTED ASPECTS OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION FOR NEGROES IN MACON COUNTY, ALABAMA 1938-39, 1943-44, 1948-49 6
(Tuskegee Institute 1950).
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on black schools relative to white schools, because the district spent no
money at all on improving or creating new black schools.44 The district
likewise spent no money on maintenance personnel, supplies or even
fuel or water for black schools.45
Further, more white students were able economically to attend
school. In the 1938-39 school year, only 73.4% of black children were
enrolled in school, and only 56.9% of those enrolled attended class on
a daily basis.46 That number declined sharply in high school, to a mere
7.8% of enrolled black students attending class on a daily basis.47 In
comparison, 43.8% of enrolled whites in high school attended class on
a daily basis.48 The disparity in both learning environment and the
ability of black children to attend school led to important differences
in education. Although only 2.3% of whites were illiterate, 22.7% of
blacks were illiterate.49
The organization that represented African American teachers in
Alabama observed in 1939 that “Maintenance of separate schools
makes it easy for [the Southern] states to deprive Negroes of an
equitable share of public school funds . . . . Thus, through
disfranchisement and the separate school system, the South has
excluded the Negro from consideration in the equitable distribution of
[state] funds to all citizens of school age.”50 By the time of Brown,
African Americans were dissatisfied with the quality of their children’s
education and ready to abandon the tradition of segregation. Most
whites were not.
II. INITIAL EROSION OF THE CASTE SYSTEM, 1954-1964
After World War II, African-Americans increased their attacks on
the racial caste system. The federal courts ruled favorably on some of
those attacks. The federal executive supported attacks on segregated
transportation,51 racially restrictive covenants,52 deprivation of the right

44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. GUZMAN, supra note 41, at 5.
49. Id. at 4.
50. NAACP PAPERS, Box C-197, folder 5, The Report of the Education Commission of
Alabama to the State Teachers Association, (Mar. 23, 1939).
51. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
52. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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to vote,53 segregated higher education,54 and, in Brown, the doctrine of
separate but equal public schools. The Southern States took steps to
protect the racial caste system, and Congress initially stayed on the
sidelines. Macon County African-Americans battled both their
exclusion from the political process and racial segregation of the public
schools.
A. Establishing the Right to Vote in Macon County
The first priority of black activists was political equality, based on
the theory that political participation would provide a path toward
realizing other rights.55 The Tuskegee Civic Association [TCA] and its
predecessor, the Tuskegee Men’s Club, encouraged Macon County
African-Americans to register to vote; it sponsored litigation against
discrimination in the registration process;56 and its leader, Charles
Gomillion, brought a landmark case challenging a gerrymander that
excluded black registrants from voting in Tuskegee.57 As one Macon
County black activist put it, the TCA sought “to achieve a type of
society in which all citizens [had] the opportunity to participate in
societal affairs, and to benefit from and enjoy public services in keeping
with their interests, abilities, and needs, without limitations or
restrictions based on race, color, creed or national origin.”58
White leaders in Macon County pushed back. Responding to the
TCA’s efforts state probate Judge Varner, a leading local conservative,
described the black vote as “getting to be a serious menace.”59 White
passive resistance intensified. For extended periods voter registrars
failed to meet,60 attempted to conceal their location, met in
inconvenient locations, and appeared unannounced in the countryside

53. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
54. E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
55. See C.G. Gomillion, The Tuskegee Voting Story, 6 CLINICAL SOC. REV. 22, 23 (1988)
(explaining the TCA objectives as studying and interpreting national civic and political trends to
“create intelligent and courageous civic and political action.”).
56. Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580, 582–84 (D. Ala. 1945), 154 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir.
1946); Wright v. Mitchell, 329 U.S. 733 (1946). On a subsequent appeal the defendants
“discovered” that they had already registered Mitchell, so he no longer had a claim against them.
For seventeen thousand dollars the TCA had registered a single voter. NORRELL, supra note 30,
at 63, 68. A month after the federal court ruling, the state court also ruled against the TCA. See
Williams v. Wright, 29 So. 2d 295, 297 (1947); Mitchell v. Wright, 69 F. Supp. 698, 702 (M.D. Ala.
1947); Denied Voting Privilege: Tuskegeeans File Appeal, PITTSBURGH COURIER, Aug. 11, 1945.
57. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
58. GUZMAN, supra note 41 at 11 (quoting a speech by Gomillion).
59. NORRELL, supra note 30, at 39.
60. Id. at 69, 71.
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to discourage applications from rural blacks.61 At times, the board of
registrars lacked a quorum to meet.62
For a brief period, a registrar appointed by populist governor Jim
Folsom at the end of 1948, registered hundreds of black voters before
the other members of the registration board stopped attending
meetings, causing the board to once again become inactive.63 Although
ceasing registration temporarily halted the TCA, at this point too many
blacks were registered for politicians to safely ignore. In 1950, a
notoriously racist sheriff, Pat Evans, was replaced by Preston Hornsby,
who was chosen by virtually every voting black, in the first black
political victory in eighty years.64
As a result of black voting power, some white politicians, such as
Hornsby, became more responsive to the black community. Yet whites
strongly resisted the idea of a black holding office, as demonstrated
when Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, a black candidate for the Macon
County School Board, ran and lost on a strictly racial vote in 1954.65
State Representative Samuel Martin Englehardt, Jr, elected in 1950,
quickly became the leading opponent of black equality in Macon
County.66 Englehardt was a talented politician who used his wry sense
of humor and public events, such as dove hunts, to appeal to voters.67
His family had deep ties to Macon County, where he owned a 6,500
acre plantation near Shorter.68 Arguing that increased black rights
would lead to black domination, he campaigned on a six-word platform:
“I stand for white supremacy, segregation.”69 Upon election,
Englehardt worked tirelessly to diminish and slow black voter
registration in Macon County, sponsored a gerrymander to exclude
most blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee,70 and mounted an
unsuccessful effort to dissolve Macon County and merge it with
counties with more white population.71

61. Id. at 71, 122.
62. Id. at 90.
63. Id. at 74–75.
64. Id.
65. GUZMAN, supra note 41, at 85.
66. Gerrymandering: New Use for an Old Device, POLITICS, Jan. 13, 1958 [hereinafter
Gerrymandering].
67. NORRELL, supra note 30, at 80.
68. Gerrymandering, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Ed Cony, Negroes Boycott Town To Fight Gerrymander Voiding Their Votes, WALL
STREET J., Nov. 5, 1957.
71. TUSKEGEE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, CRUSADE FOR CITIZENSHIP, SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN
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Until 1957, African-Americans in Macon County had relied on the
limited resources of the TCA and NAACP to vindicate their rights
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The first civil rights
act of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, however,
authorized the Attorney General to bring voting rights suits and also
created the Civil Rights Commission to investigate and report on racial
discrimination. The Commission held hearings in 1958 about
discrimination in Macon County voter registration. In February 1959,
in its first Alabama suit under the Act, the United States sued Alabama
and the Macon County Board of Registrars, alleging racial
discrimination in voter registration in Macon County. In March of 1961,
U.S. District Judge Frank M. Johnson found that the registrars had
discriminated against African-American applicants for voter
registration.72 As a result of the orders in the case, by 1963, three
thousand black voters were registered, and although a further six
thousand remained unregistered, the numbers of black and white
voters were practically equal.73 Thus, all three branches of the federal
government cooperated to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. The
stage was set for an effort to desegregate the schools.
B. The Federal Executive Helps Desegregate Macon County Schools
Despite Congress’ Inaction
While no branch of the federal government had yet sought to
enforce equal educational opportunity, by 1950, the Alabama NAACP
had switched from seeking to equalize resources between black and
white schools to seeking desegregation. It disavowed the “separate but
equal doctrine,” asserting “vigorous opposition to any and all forms of
compulsory segregation on the basis of race . . . .”74 At the Alabama
NAACP convention in Anniston that year, NAACP executive
secretary Walter White decried the “Negro-white caste system” and
called for an end to discrimination in the public schools, noting that
“the most direct educational discrimination against the Negro can be
found in the South’s segregated school system.”75 The following year
White spoke once again to the Alabama NAACP convention, stressing
THE CRUSADE FOR CIVIC DEMOCRACY IN MACON COUNTY

1 (1965); NORRELL, supra note 30,
at 97.
72. United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 679 (1961).
73. NORRELL, supra note 30, at 136.
74. NAACP PAPERS, Box A542, News Release, Segregation Condemned by Alabama
Conference (Nov. 2, 1950).
75. NAACP PAPERS, Box A542, Achieving Our Goals of First Class Citizenship.
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the cost of segregation. He urged the “enlightened South” to
“[p]ersuade churches, trade unions, parent-teachers association and
others to oppose the philosophy and propaganda of fear of the
Byrneses, Byrds, Talmadges and Fielding Wrights that horrible things
will occur if segregation is broken down.”76 The President of the
Tuskegee NAACP branch argued in 1951 that “there can be no real
elevation or equality in politics, in education, in housing, in
transportation, or in the courts, until segregation is eliminated from our
system and our thinking. That is our goal.”77
White segregationists in Macon County were at the fore of the fight
against desegregation. In 1952, Martin Englehardt was concerned by
the potential for school desegregation, so he had the Alabama
Legislative Reference Service prepare a memorandum regarding
options for maintaining segregation.78 The memo was deeply
pessimistic about the ability of the state to continue segregating
schools, and suggested that the only effective measure would be to use
state funds to operate private schools.79
On the eve of Brown, the NAACP drafted questions for candidates
in the May 1954 Democratic primary, including “[w]ill you be willing to
abide by the decision of the United States Supreme Court and sponsor
legislation designed to carry out the spirit of this decision in the
pending school cases?”80 Jim Folsom won the primary, and the NAACP
drew up for presentation to the incoming administration “a simple
statement as to what the Negro in Alabama expects” from it. The
expectations included “spend no public funds for the erection of
segregated public schools,” but said nothing about abolishing racially
segregated public schools.81 After the decision in Brown, the Tuskegee
Branch newsletter urged that new members join so that the NAACP
could “put to full use, the instruments fashioned by our highest
judiciary, and work incessantly toward a true emancipation of the
Negro.”
Because the NAACP and the TCA did not have resources to pursue
both voter discrimination and school segregation, it was not until 1963

76. NAACP PAPERS, Box A542, Excerpt from Remarks by Walter White (Nov. 10, 1951).
77. NAACP PAPERS, Box A563, Folder 7, Joseph A. Berry, M.D., The Chaff which the Wind
Driveth Away 10 (Dec., 1951).
78. Charles M. Cooper, Segregation in Public Schools (Legislative Reference Service 1952).
79. Id. at 3.
80. NAACP PAPERS, Box A543, Folder 1, Political Yardstick (Mar. 27, 1954).
81. NAACP PAPERS, Box A543, Folder 1, What the Negro in Alabama Wants (May 30, 1954).
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that Macon County African-Americans brought suit to desegregate
their public schools. When their attorney, Fred Gray, filed Lee in
January 1963, not a single black student attended public school in
Alabama with a white student. However, suits against some bigger
school districts—Birmingham, Mobile, and Huntsville—and the
University of Alabama were approaching the stage when some
desegregation orders were inevitable.82 The wall of separation was first
breached at the University of Alabama:83 in the spring of 1963, when
Governor Wallace symbolically barred Vivian Malone and James Hood
from enrolling, after which they enrolled.84
Through 1963, Congress had not acted to enforce Brown, so the
executive branch had no statutory authority to sue for desegregation.85
However, United States District Judge Frank M. Johnson, who had the
Lee case, saw a need for a federal presence in race discrimination
litigation and requested the United States to enter its appearance as an
amicus curiae with all the rights of a party.86 Assistant Attorney

82. Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Birmingham, 333 F.2d 47, 53 (5th Cir. 1964);
Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs. of Mobile Cty., 219 F. Supp. 542, 542 (S.D. Ala. 1963); see also
Challen Stephens, Timeline: Race and Schools in Huntsville, ALABAMA.COM (2014), http://blog.
al.com/breaking/2014/03/timeline_race_and_schools_in_h.html (discussing Huntsville’s refusal to
defy a federal court order to desegregate in 1963 and the resulting partial integration of Huntsville
schools).
83. In 1956 Autherine Lucy’s enrollment as a graduate student at the University of Alabama
had touched off a riot by a mob of 3,000 persons. Lucy “was the first black student in the history
of desegregation to be greeted with organized violence.” DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME
HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, THE CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
99 (Simon & Schuster 2001). She protested the University’s response to the riot, and the
University seized on this to justify expelling her; the federal court upheld her expulsion. The
federal government had played no role in the Lucy case, but President Eisenhower’s assistant,
Sherman Adams, had worried that the success of the rioters would set a dangerous precedent for
future action. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954-1963 181 (Simon & Schuster 1989); see also J. EDGAR HOOVER, RACIAL TENSION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (Mar. 1, 1956).
84. Even before his inauguration, Wallace had told Senator John Sparkman of Alabama that
although he felt impelled to appear “bodily” to resist integration of the University, he was “under
no misapprehension as to his ability to accomplish anything.” MICHAL BELKNAP, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, 1945-1968 452 (Garland Press 1991).
Before standing in the door Wallace “urged pro-segregation zealots to stay away.” Bob Duke,
Keep Away, Wallace Tells Pro-Segregation Zealots, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 1, 1963.
“Wallace would contend later that his symbolic action kept disruptive elements away, keeping
the peace at the University of Alabama, in contrast to the riot that left two people dead the
previous September, when James Meredith enrolled at the University of Mississippi.” JACK BASS,
TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE
SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 207 (Doubleday 1992).
85. See Constitutional Amendments, supra note 15.
86. BASS, supra note 84, at 162.
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General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall agreed to do so.87 In essence,
the court and the executive were executing an end run around
Congress’ inaction.
Participation in Lee marked a transition of the role of the United
States in school desegregation cases. While the United States had taken
a substantive position in Brown I88 and II89 and in the recently decided
case, Goss v. Board of Education90, it had entered district court cases as
an amicus only when beleaguered school systems or district courts had
sought help in enforcing existing decrees.91 In Lee, the United States
would, as in the past, take positions on interference with court orders.
In addition, however, it would now become involved in the substance
of the relief and in monitoring compliance. Recognizing the resources
the federal government had at its disposal, both the Department of
Justice and Judge Johnson desired that the DOJ be “deep into the
supervision of the school system” and relieve the private attorney of
some of the burden of monitoring compliance. 92 According to
plaintiff’s attorney Fred Gray, Judge Johnson “wanted to be sure the
U.S. government was a party to the action as the case progressed so that
when he entered an order he could expect the U.S. government to
enforce it.”93
Believing that orderly integration under their own control was
better than the sort of detailed order issued to the board of registrars
in a comparable voting discrimination case, the school board prepared
to integrate the schools.94 Despite George Wallace’s bravado in his
inauguration speech in January, the courts in the Birmingham, Mobile,
Huntsville and Macon County cases all ordered desegregation to begin
in the Fall 1963 semester.95 In Macon County, the all-white Tuskegee
high school was to be opened to applications from African-American
87. Id.
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding state-imposed racial segregation of public schools
unconstitutional).
89. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that school systems must desegregate “with all deliberate
speed”).
90. 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Brief of United States, Goss v. Bd. of Educ., No. 217, 1963 WL
105481 (Oct. 1962).
91. E.g. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
92. John Doar, Report on Status of School Desegregation – Macon County, Alabama, Aug.
26, 1963.
93. GRAY, supra note 30, at 205.
94. GUZMAN, supra note 41, at 153.
95. Landsberg, supra note 31, at 873. Wallace had vowed, “I draw the line in the dust and
toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow,
segregation forever.” George C. Wallace, Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963).
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students. The school board selected 13 of the 27 who applied. The
school superintendent made plans for a smooth opening day, and Fred
Gray and John Doar, deputy to Burke Marshall in the U.S. Civil Rights
Division, met with the black students to prepare them for integration.
Wallace sent Alabama State Troopers to prevent school from
opening as scheduled. The following week he again sent the troopers,
this time to keep the African-American students from enrolling in
white schools in Macon County, Birmingham and Mobile. Assistant
Attorney General Marshall filed a suit against Wallace and others to
enjoin interference with the school desegregation orders, and the five
federal judges from the three judicial districts in Alabama convened as
a court and enjoined the defendants from interfering with the courtordered desegregation.96 Although Congress had not specifically
authorized the Attorney General to bring a suit such as this, the court
in the Wallace case recognized the interest of the United States and did
not even mention the lack of statutory authority. It ruled, “The plaintiff
[the United States] is suffering and, unless an injunction is entered, will
continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury as a consequence
of the impairment of deprivation of rights under the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”97
Wallace, however, continued to interfere. He helped create a private
school for the white students from Tuskegee High School and arranged
to transport white students to the other two white public high schools
in the county.98 His state board of education ordered that Tuskegee
High be closed and that its few remaining students (all Black) be
assigned to the Black high school.99 Fred Gray joined Wallace and state
officials to the Lee case and, with partial support from the United
States, sought relief against them.100 The court ordered that the Black
students who had been assigned to Tuskegee High School be reassigned
to the two remaining White high schools.101 The court, now comprised
of three judges because Gray was attacking the constitutionality of
96. U.S. v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
97. Id. at 488. This ruling adopted verbatim the language of paragraph 32 of the Complaint.
Id.
98. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 747–48 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
99. Id. at 748.
100. Ironically, one of the added defendants, State Superintendent of Education Austin
Meadows, had approved Fred Gray’s application for the State of Alabama to pay for his legal
education out-of-state, because the University of Alabama Law School was not open to black
students at the time. Testimony of Austin Meadows, Transcript of Nov. 30, 1966 hearing at 22
(1966).
101. Lee, 231 F. Supp. at 751.
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Alabama’s tuition grant statute, enjoined Wallace from further
interference with school desegregation throughout Alabama and held
the tuition grant statute unconstitutional.102 Although asked, it declined
to order statewide desegregation. Its order, though, set the stage for the
next chapter.

III. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE ROAD TO STATEWIDE
RELIEF

A. The Federal Role Unfolds
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education began as a suit to
desegregate only one school system, as was the general practice. Given
the resistance to desegregation in the Deep South, this approach could
have required thousands of individual school desegregation suits. Fred
Gray’s motion to join the state defendants and order statewide
desegregation essentially asked the court to treat school desegregation
on a wholesale basis, rather than retail. He had been inspired by the
Governor’s intransigent actions to ask for a bold remedy that no court
had to that time awarded.103 The remedy he requested would have
shifted the burden of desegregation from plaintiffs in each school
district to the state. While the court was not yet ready to impose this
unprecedented form of relief, its decision enjoining the state officials
from interfering with court-ordered school desegregation anywhere in
Alabama laid the foundation for the novel and sweeping relief that
eventually emerged in the case
The court announced its ruling eleven days after the effective date
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.104 The legislation added nothing of
immediate relevance to the issues before the court, and the court did
not mention the new statute in its opinion.105 Instead, recognizing that
state officials have an affirmative duty to eliminate racial
discrimination in the public schools, the court rested its ruling squarely
on Brown,106 the case involving Governor Faubus’ interference with
102. Id. at 755.
103. GRAY, supra note 30, at 107.
104. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (enacted July 2, 1964) with Lee, 231 F.
Supp. at 743 (decided July 13, 1964).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 756–57.
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school desegregation in Little Rock,107 and later Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit cases implementing Brown.108
The court rendered its decision in a time of increasing racial
turmoil. The “Mississippi Summer” that the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was devoting to voter registration
activities had exploded with the disappearance in June of three civil
rights workers.109 SNCC was also active in Selma, where black efforts
to use public accommodations that the new Civil Rights Act had
opened to them led to more lawless behavior by Sheriff Clark.110 School
openings in Alabama, however, occurred without major incident, with
slight increases in desegregation both in 1964 and 1965.111 By 1965 in
Macon County, 32 African-Americans were attending formerly allwhite schools and eight whites were attending formerly all-black
schools .112 Statewide, slightly over 1,000 African-American students in
Alabama (.34% of Alabama’s black students) were attending formerly
all-white schools.113
Preparing for the opening of schools, in 1964, DOJ attorney
Jonathan Sutin contacted school authorities, civic leaders, law
enforcement authorities, and black leaders.114 Tuskegee High School
was to be reopened, and it was unclear how many whites would show
up; only a handful had signed up for the desegregated grades.115 Rumors
were flying in the white community about a flood of black students
enrolling, but in fact only 14 in grades 9-11 were expected.116 Sheriff
Hornsby would use his limited force [two or three] to watch the school,
but there was concern that the Chief of Police could not be trusted.117
107. Id. at 752.
108. Id. at 753.
109. HOWARD BALL, MURDER IN MISSISSIPPI: UNITED STATES V. PRICE AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, (Univ. of Kan. Press 2004).
110. HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS 149–66 (South End Press 2002).
111. See Report on the Desegregation in the Schools in Alabama, President John F. Kennedy
(Sept. 9, 1963) (describing how 11 schools successfully carried out desegregation without issue).
112. Brief of the United States at App. C, Table VI, Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 270 F.
Supp. 859, (M.D. Ala. 1967) (No. 604-E).
113. Id.
114. Jonathan R. Sutin, Interviews in Preparation for School Desegregation in Macon Cty.,
Ala., to DOJ File 144-100-2-1 (Sept. 4, 1964) (on file with National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Md., box 1, section 3) [hereinafter Sutin to DOJ File].
115. See Frank M. Johnson, Jr., School Desegregation Problems in the South: An Historical
Perspective, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (1970) (explaining how only 35 out 250 white students
showed up for the first day of class after reopening Tuskegee High School).
116. Sutin to DOJ File, supra note 114.
117. Cf. State Police Patrol 2 Alabama Schools, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1964 (discussing how
Governor Wallace sent state troopers to integration sites to “keep the peace” but also “to resist”).
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The school board hired a night watchman, who resigned after receiving
threats; a second resigned, also citing to threats; a third was hired.118 In
spite of all this, 19 white teachers were expected at the K-12 Tuskegee
High School.119 It was reported that the all-white private school, Macon
Academy, had over 300 enrollees and that Governor Wallace had
donated $6,000 of his campaign funds to it.120 Although not expecting
trouble, the Attorney General alerted the President; as President
Johnson’s assistant, Lee White, reported to him, “the Justice
Department appears to have taken the necessary proper precautions
and either National Guard or federal troops can be called into action if
needed.” The Department had twenty U.S. Marshals in the area, and
the Army made plans for a backup emergency force of 1800 Alabama
National Guardsmen.121
Sutin, with John Doar, returned to the county on the eve of school
opening and attended a meeting of black parents and school children
and a few white parents, including the sheriff and the local banker. By
late October, Doar could report that white enrollment had slightly risen
and that some students from the Academy had transferred back to
Tuskegee High School because of concerns about educational quality,
costs, and the atmosphere of hate at Macon Academy. The school had
enough students to field an all-white football team.122 By the second
semester, white enrollment had stopped its rise, amid rumored pressure
on 40 Macon Academy students not to transfer back to the integrated
school. Still, 95 whites were attending the high school grades at
Tuskegee High.123

118. Sutin to DOJ file, supra note 114.
119. In the spring the FBI had reported that no white teachers were expected to teach in the
desegregated school in the fall. FBI Memorandum Regarding Racial Situation School Integration
Matters in Macon Cty., Ala. to DOJ file 144-100-2-1 (May 26, 1964) (on file with the National
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., box 1, section 2) [hereinafter FBI
Memorandum].
120. Sutin to DOJ File, supra note 114.
121. Letter from Lee White, Assoc. Special Counsel to the President, to President Johnson
(Sept. 5, 1964), attaching the Memorandum From Nick Katzenbach, Regarding School
Desegregation in Alabama Pursuant to Federal Court Order, to President Johnson (Sept. 4, 1964)
(on file with LBJ Presidential Library, Box 51, Executive HU 2-5) (The President wrote, “Do I
need to do anything,” and White responded that he did not).
122. However, the school appears not to have fielded a team in 1964 or 1965. Tuskegee
Indians, ALABAMA STATE FOOTBALL HISTORICAL ASSOC., http://www.ahsfhs.org/teams2/
teampage.asp?Team=Tuskege (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). Macon Academy fielded its first football
team that year. Macon Academy Knights, ALABAMA STATE FOOTBALL HISTORICAL ASSOC.,
http://www.ahsfhs.org/teams2/teampage.asp?Team=Macon% 20Academy (last visited Feb. 5,
2015).
123. Memorandum from John Doar, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen to St. John Barrett,
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The question in 1963 had been whether the schools would
desegregate. Neither the private plaintiffs nor the United States had
suggested what that would mean. It was not clear what the AfricanAmerican community wanted: was it access to the white school or a
more systemic and complete desegregation. By 1965 the question was
not whether, but how and how much.
During the ten years that had elapsed since Brown the Supreme
Court had provided little guidance on the “how” and “how much”
questions. The Southern states had adopted so-called pupil placement
laws, based on the premise that “[s]omebody must enroll the pupils in
schools. They cannot enroll themselves; and we can think of no one
better qualified to undertake the task than the officials of the schools
and the school boards having the schools in charge.”124
The Alabama law required the school authorities to consider a long
list of criteria in making student assignments. Among them were “the
psychological qualification of the pupil for the type of teaching and
association involved,” “the possibility or threat of friction or disorder
among pupils or others,” and “the maintenance or severance of
established social and psychological relationships with other pupils and
with teachers.”125 Implicitly, these criteria preferred assigning black
students to black schools and white students to white schools.
The question the school desegregation cases presented to the
Department of Justice was whether to simply apply the Supreme Court
cases allowing the use of pupil placement plans and deliberate speed
or to argue in favor of more robust relief that would completely
desegregate the school system.126 As a law enforcement agency, not a
civil rights organization, what should guide the Department in making
that decision: the rather vague Supreme Court rulings or some vision
of a desired final result? This question was not yet a burning one, as the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the main civil rights organization
litigating school desegregation claims, had been content to settle
initially for the enrollment of a few African-Americans in formerly
white schools.127
Second Assistant, Regarding School Desegregation in Lee v. Macon County School Board, and
DOJ File 144-100-2-1 (Jan. 30, 1965) (on file at the National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Md., box 1, section 3) [hereinafter Doar to Johnson].
124. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
125. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
126. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958), aff’g. mem. 162
F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
127. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
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The Macon County school board had proposed a desegregation
plan in 1964 under which desegregation would not be complete until
the 1969–70 school year. Moreover, desegregation would be
accomplished by allowing students to transfer schools, rather than by
non-racial initial assignments. The court approved only the proposal for
1964–65.128
In April 1965, Sutin and Fred Gray had another desegregation case
before Judge Johnson. After the hearing, the three of them returned to
the Judge’s chambers and discussed Macon County. Judge Johnson
asked Sutin to check on the plans for next year. Sutin did so and
returned to report to Judge Johnson that the school board proposed to
add only the second grade to the list of desegregated grades. Judge
Johnson and Sutin agreed that that was too slow, and the judge directed
Sutin to prepare a plan desegregating three more grades in the fall and
to cover all grades in 1966–67.129 Judge Johnson’s proactive stance
included asking DOJ to investigate the all-white Macon Academy.130 In
May 1966 the school district began distributing free choice forms.
By June 1965, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals answered the
question of when desegregation should be completed. Judge Wisdom
wrote for the court:
The time has come for foot-dragging public school boards to move
with celerity toward desegregation. Since May 17, 1954, public school
boards throughout the country have known that they must
desegregate their schools. And as the law moved with rising tempo
to meet changing conditions, school boards might have foreseen that
further delays would pile up rather than spread their nettlesome
problems. This Court has urged school authorities to grasp the nettle
now. We have put them on notice that, ‘The rule has become: the
later the start, the shorter the time allowed for transition.’131

The court also recognized and gave deference to a new player that
had entered the picture—the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) (subsequently split into two
departments: the Department of Education and the Department of
Health and Human Services). HEW administered federal aid to
education programs, which became a significant source of revenue for

LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 252 (1994).
128. Order of August 7, 1964, Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Education, (unreported).
129. Sutin to DOJ File, supra note 114.
130. Doar to Johnson, supra note 123.
131. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965).
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local school boards when Congress passed the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965.132 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 proscribed federal agencies from extending federal financial
assistance to programs or activities that discriminated on account of
race. HEW had issued its first set of Guidelines for Desegregation in
April 1965.133 The court said, “There should be a close correlation . . .
between the judiciary’s standards in enforcing the national policy
requiring desegregation of public schools and the executive
department’s standards in administering this policy.”134
The court adopted HEW’s 1967 deadline for completion of school
desegregation.135 While the court did not address the content of the
desegregation plan, it had set a precedent for looking to HEW on
matters of educational policy and implementation, directing that “As
to details of the plan, the Board should be guided by the [Office of
Education Title VI Guidelines].”136 Because Macon County schools
were operating under a court ordered desegregation plan, they did not
have to separately show HEW that their desegregation plan met HEW
requirements. However, the court, following the Fifth Circuit’s
decisions in Singleton, ordered the school system to adopt a “freedom
of choice” plan, under which all students, in all grades, would choose
the school they wished to attend. The order was not confined, however,
to student desegregation.137 It also required some faculty
desegregation, desegregation of student activities, closing of some
unequal facilities and equalization of others, and “remedial educational
programs to eliminate the effects of past discrimination . . . .”138
By the summer of 1966 Charles Gomillion was a member of the
Macon County School Board,139 and the Macon County school
superintendent was struggling with faculty desegregation, with some
teachers resisting assignment to schools traditionally of another race.
However, at least one or two black teachers would be assigned to white
132. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10.
133. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICIES
UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, April 1965.
134. Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1965).
135. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1965).
136. Id.
137. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Ed., 253 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Ala. 1966). The order was signed
by all three judges, though the issue was not one that required a three judge court.
138. Id.
139. Summary of the Deposition of Dr. C.G. Gomillion at Volume III, 290, United States v.
State of Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (No. 2255-N).
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schools. The superintendent also expressed concern that over 250 black
students and 192 white students had chosen Tuskegee High School; if
enrollment were over 60% black, he predicted, the whites would flee.140
Two years after the first African-American students enrolled in
white public schools in Alabama there were signs that resistance to
desegregation was weakening. At a meeting of the Alabama
Association of Secondary School Principals, a panel of speakers from
desegregated districts advised “that integration can be orderly and not
detrimental to the school program if enough planning is done
beforehand.”141 In August, Auburn University sponsored a conference
of school board members and school superintendents to discuss
desegregation. The keynote speaker, Atlanta school superintendent
John Letson, observed that there was no longer a question whether the
schools would be integrated and that “the fear of this problem is much
greater than the reality.”142 He added, “students are students,”
regardless of their race.143 The Birmingham News editorialized that
“the only sensible course is to insure that transition [to desegregation]
is handled with a minimum of disruption to the education of all young
people, both white and Negro.”144 A common theme at the conference
was that “We are not here to discuss whether to desegregate but how
to desegregate.”145 School opening in 1965 was relatively peaceful
compared to the prior two years. However, more storm clouds were
gathering.
B. Governor Wallace’s Interference With Federal Enforcement of the
Civil Rights Act Leads to A Hearing on Statewide Relief
Even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed, Lee White,
Associate Special Counsel to President Johnson, had urged that there
be “prompt and coordinated action” by agencies to assure compliance
by school districts.146 HEW’s first step under Title VI was to adopt a

140. Groark-file, DOJ file 144-100-2-1, (Aug. 5, 1966) (National Archives & Records
Administration, College Park, Md., box 1, section 3).
141. James Chisum, Plans Held Key to School ‘Mix’, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 28, 1965,
at 2.
142. James Chisum, Not So Bad, Speaker Says; Educators Told to Face Mixing, THE
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 16, 1965.
143. Id.
144. Dr. Letson’s Helpful Counsel, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 17, 1965.
145. James Chisum, Slow White Student May Benefit by Mix, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug.
17, 1965.
146. Memorandum from Lee White, Associate Special Counsel to the President, to Lisle
Carter, Deputy Assistant Secretary, HEW, and others (May 11, 1964) (on file with the LBJ
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regulation in December 1964 that required state and local school
authorities to sign an assurance that they would not discriminate based
on race as a prerequisite to federal assistance. Rather than halt funding
of Southern school systems, most of which were still racially segregated,
the regulation allowed continued funding of school systems that were
implementing a school desegregation plan HEW deemed “is adequate
to accomplish the purposes of the Act and” the regulation under the
Act.147 But the SNCC opined that the regulation and a three page set
of instructions from HEW to school systems “were at best sketchy and
at worst so vague as to render them absolutely meaningless and
ineffective.”148
The requirement that recipients sign the assurance triggered a
confrontation between Alabama’s Governor Wallace and State
Superintendent Austin Meadows and HEW.149 A month after the
regulation was published, Meadows noted that Alabama schools stood
to lose over $32 million in federal funds if it did not comply: “We are
damned if we sign, but we are twice damned if we don’t [because they
could both lose federal money and be sued by DOJ under Title IV of
the new Act].”150 He recounted the gains in black enrollment, teachers’
salaries, new black trade schools, and other advances, and then closed
by asking: “will all of this be destroyed by outsiders who either do not
understand or do not care enough for either race in Alabama?”151
The stakes for local school systems dramatically increased with the
passage of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, a key element of President Johnson’s War on Poverty.152 Title I for
the first time infused large sums of federal money into local schools,
primarily to improve educational opportunities of low income students.
Alabama schools were to receive $34.6 million.153 Title I would often
benefit the same students that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Presidential Library).
147. 46 C.F.R § 80.4(c) (2016).
148. MARION S. BARRY, JR. & BETTY GARMAN, STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING
COMMITTEE, SNCC: A Special Report on Southern School Desegregation, 3 (Mar. 1, 1967) (on
file with the LBJ Presidential Library).
149. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 467–68 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
150. Bob Ingram, Meadows Says Threatened Loss of Federal Funds Would Cripple Schools,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 5, 1965.
151. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 465.
152. GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS
AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4 (John Wiley & Sons 1969).
153. James Chisum, School Aid Funds Revised Upward, THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 3,
1965 (discussing how $546,105 of the funds were slated to go to Macon County schools).
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was designed to protect. Yet there was a built in tension between the
two laws, since the primary statutory remedy for a violation of Title VI
was termination of the financial assistance. After initially publishing
regulations under Title VI, HEW began requiring school systems to
submit desegregation plans to show that they were in compliance.154 By
April 1965 HEW had received over 500 plans that it deemed
inadequate. After discussion with DOJ, HEW adopted guidelines that
explained what would be deemed adequate, in hopes that this would
eliminate the need to evaluate plans one by one.155 By the summer of
1965 HEW was geared up to enforce Title VI against school systems,
requiring them to sign assurances that they would not discriminate
based on race.156 In July Vice President Humphrey warned President
Johnson of a large backlog of school desegregation plans that had been
submitted to HEW but not yet processed, due to lack of resources.
Commencing in the fall, HEW provided the President with weekly
reports on the status of compliance.157
The question became how to ensure compliance with Title VI and
continue funding under Title I. HEW issued its first set of “Guidelines”
explaining its expectations for school desegregation.158 Governor
Wallace found administrative enforcement, backed by legislation, no
more palatable than judicial enforcement . He attended a meeting of
Southern Governors, who issued a statement complaining that the
Guidelines were confusing, contradictory, and “so far reaching as to
jeopardize the future of public education in many school districts
throughout the United States.”159 On June 23 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit not only held the Guidelines lawful, but
said that courts should follow the Guidelines in fashioning school
desegregation relief.160 The next day the Alabama legislature adopted a
resolution embracing the Governors’ statement and recommending
154. 45 CFR § 80.4(c) (2015).
155. Memorandum from Douglas Cater, Attaching An Unsigned Memorandum from April
23, 1965, to Marvin Watson (April 26, 1965) (on file with the LBJ Presidential Library).
156. ORFIELD, supra note 152, at 109.
157. See, e.g., Report from Joe Califano to the President (Sept. 2, 1965) (on file with the LBJ
Presidential Library) (transmitting the Wednesday evening report on desegregation).
158. The 1965 guidelines “required that at least four grades be desegregated for the 1965-66
school year and established criteria for judging geographical and free choice systems of student
assignment.” BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 139 (1997) (discussing how these were not regulations with the force of
law, so HEW could issue guidelines without the President’s signature).
159. Text of Governors’ Statement, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, June 1965, at 2.
160. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 729(5th Cir. 1965); see also
Price v. Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
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that school systems defer compliance with the Guidelines, pending
court challenges to them.161
By summer 1965, Governor Wallace and State Superintendent
Meadows had escalated the volume and scope of their attacks. Wallace
exhorted school systems that had submitted plans to HEW describing
how they would desegregate to “reconsider your action in the
submission of your compliance plan.”162 In 1966, Wallace called for a
special session of the legislature to declare HEW’s 1966 Guidelines
unconstitutional.163 Before this call, several school systems had declined
to comply with the Guidelines until, as one superintendent put it,
“Governor Wallace says so.”164
Although both houses of the Alabama Legislature had passed
resolutions in August urging school officials to resist the illegal
Guidelines,165 Wallace wanted the legislature to declare the HEW
guidelines null and void and to promise to appropriate money to
replace any federal money that school systems might lose by refusing
to follow the guidelines. The legislature promptly enacted the law that
Wallace had asked for.166 Wallace then threatened to use Alabama State
Troopers to stop black teachers from teaching in white schools in
Tuscaloosa County. Several school systems refused to follow the
Guidelines because of the new Alabama law.
In response to Wallace’s actions, private plaintiffs filed a bold and
sweeping motion in September to hold him in contempt for his actions
or, in the alternative, to require schools be desegregated.167 The court
denied the plaintiffs’ contempt motion, but set the motion for statewide
desegregation for hearing on November 30, 1966.168

161. 1965 Ala. Acts 16.
162. The telegrams were introduced as exhibits to depositions of school superintendents that
became part of the record in the 1966 Lee trial. Enterprise, Govt. Ex. 11; Jacksonville, Govt. Ex.
9.
163. See Trial Brief of the United States at 42, Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (citing the Government Exhibit number 92, a November 1966 hearing)
[hereinafter United States Trial Brief].
164. See id. at 26 (citing Government Exhibit Number 2, a May 23, 1966 call from C. C. Ring
to Hugh W. Williamson).
165. See id. at 41, n.101 (citing Government Exhibit Number 83).
166. 1966 Ala. Acts 252. One of the sponsors of the law, Hugh Locke, testified by deposition.
He objected to the guidelines as a federal invasion of state’s rights. He also opined that Brown
was “a usurpation and tilting of the constitutional balance of power between the Federal
Government and the State Government.” Examination of Hugh A. Hugh Locke Jr. by Mr. Adams
at 50, Lee.
167. Motion for an Order to Show Cause or, in the Alternative, for Further Relief, Lee.
168. Order of Sept. 30, 1966, Lee.
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The day after plaintiffs filed their motion Judge Johnson wrote to
John Doar asking that he “make known, as early as possible, the
position of the United States on this matter.”169 Although Doar sent no
formal answer, within two weeks he had mobilized a large trial team,
under the supervision of one of his top assistants, St. John Barrett, the
Division’s most experienced litigator.170 In a meeting the following
week, Doar spoke with staff about the need for complete and full
desegregation of schools in Alabama and about some of the difficulties
he saw. He said that desegregation would have to comply with the latest
rulings of the appellate courts and should be as uniform as possible.
And he worried whether the court would be able to enforce
compliance.171
C. The Federal Government’s Expanded Role and the Proceedings
Leading to Statewide Relief
At the end of September the court set the statewide desegregation
motion for hearing on November 30, and although DOJ had not yet
taken a position in the case, John Doar deployed a large trial team to
delve more deeply and explore the extent of the State of Alabama’s
complicity in school segregation. No court had yet issued statewide
relief in a school desegregation case, and it seemed prudent to present
proof supporting the liability of the state officials. The nature of the
state control might also prove useful in fashioning relief. Although the
broad outlines of the extent to which the state officials had interfered
with school desegregation and the extent of their legal authority over
local school districts may have been known, the CRD opted to conduct
extensive discovery regarding the state’s role in school construction,
assignment of faculty and staff, and transportation, always favoring
racial segregation. The trial team, inspected Alabama Department of
Education files, took depositions of school superintendents and divided
up the analysis of the information.
In just six weeks the trial team took depositions of seven state
officials and 38 local school superintendents, and inspected records at

169. Letter from Frank M. Johnson, Regarding Lee, et al. * * * United States v. Macon Cty. Bd.
of Educ., to John Doar, Assistant Attorney Gen. Civil Rights Division and DOJ File 144-100-2-1
(Sept. 23, 1966) (on file with Library of Congress Frank M. Johnson Collection).
170. Barrett came to DOJ in 1954, after serving as an assistant district attorney in California.
See ST. JOHN BARRETT, THE DRIVE FOR EQUALITY: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT, 1954-1965 13 (PublishAmerica 2009).
171. Handwritten Notes Taken by Brian Landsberg (Oct. 17, 1966).
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state and local levels..172 Private plaintiffs participated in some of this
discovery, but did not have the resources to do so in full.
A respectable argument could have been made that since the state
had required the creation of racially segregated school systems the state
had an affirmative obligation to dismantle them. After all, of 294,737
African-American children in Alabama public schools, only 1,009
attended school with whites.173 The proof in the case showed much
deeper state complicity in school segregation. A few examples make
the point.
The Alabama Department of Education, upon request from local
school systems, conducted periodic school surveys of most school
systems in the state, inspecting school sites and buildings and
transportation systems. The Department reports on the surveys make
recommendations on future use of school sites and buildings.174 CRD
exhibits graphically showed how state school surveys, ostensibly
undertaken to improve education in the surveyed school systems,
perpetuated the racially dual school system. Two government exhibits
contrasted the segregative recommendations for school use in Calhoun
County with the more compact and desegregated alternatives that were
available. As the court concluded, “Such a method of consolidation was
for no purpose other than to perpetuate segregation of the races.”175
The surveys recommended school construction separately for each race
and recommended segregated transportation routes for students.

172. The defendants also conducted depositions of the U.S. Commissioner of Education and
a Civil Rights Specialist in the United States Office of Education.
173. United States Trial Brief, supra note 163, at Appendix C, Table I.
174. Direct Examination of Dr. George L. Layton, Director, Division of Administration and
Finance, Ala. Dep’t of Educ. by Mr. Landsberg at 1–2, Lee.
175. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 471
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The Governor and State Superintendent used extraordinary
measures to carry out “the public policy of the State that Negro
teachers not teach white children.”176 The statistics confirmed the
policy: of over 28,000 teachers in the State, only 76 were teaching in
schools of the other race.177
The state defendants’ deliberate interference with school
desegregation was ubiquitous, constant, and both general and targeted,
and it began even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.178 In
1953 the Alabama Legislature appointed a committee to prepare
legislation in the event that the Court’s decision “destroys or impairs
the principle of separation of the races in the public schools of this
State.”179 In 1956 the Legislature declared the Brown decision null and
void.180 And, of course, the Governor deployed state police to stop
desegregation in 1963, as described earlier. These early actions serve as
backdrop to the state defendants’ continued interference with school
desegregation after the 1964 order in Lee enjoined them from further
interference with school desegregation.
The trial began with Fred Gray, representing Anthony Lee and his
co-plaintiffs, questioning Austin Meadows. The court’s 1964 order had
not only enjoined the state defendants from interference, but had also
ordered them to use their authority “to devote every effort toward
initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial
discrimination in the public school system.”181 Yet the records of the
State Department of Education revealed no efforts to eliminate racial
discrimination. This led to the following colloquy between Gray and
Meadows:
Q. Can you relate to this court or refer to this court any written
document in your office or release of any sort that you have sent to
City and County Boards of Education in which you encouraged or
promoted the elimination of segregated school systems in this
State?
176. Summary of Depositions, Direct Examination of Superintendent Elliot by Mr.
Landsberg at 66–67, Lee.
177. United States Trial Brief, supra note 163, at Appendix C, Table I & Government Exhibit
Number 156.
178. See, e.g., State of Ala. Legislative Reference Service Memorandum Prepared By Charles
M. Cooper, Director, Regarding Segregation in Public Schools, for Hon. Sam M. Engelhardt Jr.,
Representative from Macon County (Nov. 26, 1952) (on file with Alabama State Archives, LPR
111, Box 3, Folder 3).
179. 1952 Ala. Acts 894, cited in United States Trial Brief, supra note 163, at 9, n.11.
180. 1956 Ala. Acts 42, cited in United States Trial Brief, supra note 163, at 10, n.14.
181. Lee at 756.
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A. No. I approach it from nondiscrimination viewpoint.182

Meadows’ defense was that he had been ordered to encourage the
elimination of racial discrimination but not racial segregation. 183
Statistics suggested that the efforts of Wallace and Meadows largely
succeeded in fending off desegregation. Alabama, with only 2.4% of its
black students attending school with whites, had less desegregation
than any other Southern state, less even than Mississippi.184 Forty five
Alabama school districts had neither a court ordered desegregation
plan nor a plan approved by HEW.
In short, the evidence established that the state officials had not
only failed to promote desegregation of the schools, but had actively
promoted segregation and had interfered with those school systems
that were willing to desegregate. The question then became how to
fashion relief against the state officials.
CRD considered asking the court to appoint a special master to
take over the desegregation responsibilities of the State
Superintendent of Schools,185 or order the State Superintendent “to
require as a prerequisite to payment of state money that the recipient
school board provide education on a desegregated, non-racial basis.”186
While supporting complete and full desegregation of Alabama schools,
John Doar worried about how a court could effectively desegregate a
disparate group of urban and rural school districts.
The court issued its decision on March 22, 1967. The court’s lengthy
opinion develops the facts to conclude:
Not only have these defendants, through their control and influence
over the local school boards, flouted every effort to make the
Fourteenth Amendment a meaningful reality to Negro school
children in Alabama; they have apparently dedicated themselves
and . . . have committed the powers and resources of their offices to
the continuation of a dual school system such as that condemned by

182. Transcript of Record at 78, Lee.
183. Id. at 114. “I have never encouraged anybody to initiate desegregation plans. I have
urged . . . that they not discriminate against any individuals, and if that required desegregation,
then they would have to follow desegregation, but only to prevent discrimination has been my
recommendation, prior to the Civil Rights Act and the U.S. Office of Education guidelines.”
184. United States Trial Brief, supra note 163, at 120.
185. Landsberg notes of 8/24/66 meeting with John Doar (on file with author).
186. Letter from Frank M. Dunbaugh, Acting Chief Southeastern Division of the DOJ,
Regarding Ala. State Basketball Tournament—Participation by Tuskegee High School, to John
Doar, Assistant Attorney Gen. and DOJ file 144-100-2-1 at 6. (Feb. 14, 1966) (on file with the
National Archives and Records Administration box 1, section 3).
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Brown v. Board of Education . . . . As a result of such efforts . . . today
only a very small percentage of students in Alabama are enrolled in
desegregated schools.187

The court noted that the defendants’ segregative activities had
infected virtually every aspect of public education and that,
accordingly, the remedy “must be designed to reach the limits of the
defendants’ activities in these several areas and must be designed to
require the defendants to . . . disestablish” the racial dual system in
school systems covered by the decree.188 The court somewhat
optimistically suggested that once the state coercion to resist
desegregation was removed the local school systems would comply
with orders from the State Superintendent to comply with the uniform
state plan, and it rejected the defense argument that these school
systems were indispensable parties.
IV. AFTERMATH: THE REPONSE TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
STATEWIDE DECREE.
Although meeting resistance from the Governor and some school
systems, the decree led to significant progress in desegregating
Alabama’s schools. DOJ and HEW played a key role in developing
desegregation guidelines and enforcing the court’s order, and HEW’s
unique role as a funder and enforcer led to a confrontation between
local school systems and the government.
Governor Lurleen Wallace declared the decree created “an
emergency which threatens our state,” “with which compliance is a
physical impossibility.” Governor Wallace then asked the legislature to
place in the hands of the Governor “all powers heretofore vested . . . in
the State Superintendent of Education.” She also asked the legislature
to issue a cease and desist order to the judges handling Lee, “advising
them that their actions are beyond the police power of the State of
Alabama.”189 All that came of her speech, however, were stay motions
in the trial court Court and an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme
Court.190

187. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 465 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
188. Id. at 478.
189. Governor Lurleen Wallace, Address Before the Joint Session, Alabama Legislature
(Mar. 30, 1967, 7:30 p.m.), Frank M. Johnson Collection, Library of Congress, Box 21, Folder 5.
190. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
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By April, only five school systems failed to present compliant
plans.191 The court added those systems as defendants in the case, thus
expanding the reach of the District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama to the other two federal judicial districts.192 By late July the
court noted that 98 of the 99 school systems listed in the March decree
had adopted plans that complied with the decree.193
Alabama school systems listed in the decree confronted differing
requirements under Title VI and under the decree. Among other
differences, Title VI required them to satisfy HEW that they were not
discriminating; the decree required the State Superintendent to make
this determination.194 The school districts were not parties to the case,
so the question became how they were to reconcile these differences.
While the regulation and guidelines made sense in the abstract, the
question was how they should apply in the statewide order.
The issue came to a head in the summer of 1967. The Lanett City
school system consisted of two schools, a white school enrolling 1309
students and a black school enrolling 606 students. It adopted a
freedom of choice plan in 1966.195 Free choice would lead to minimal
desegregation in the fall of 1967: 6 black students to the white school
and 5 whites to the black school.196 However, the plan complied with
the standards established by the order in Lee. Lanett moved to enjoin
HEW from cutting off its federal funding. The Court held that because
Lanett had agreed to comply with the Lee order, HEW could not cut
off funds based on non-compliance with the Guidelines. HEW should
have first brought to the Court’s attention its findings and views. It was
up to the Court, not HEW, to make a final determination whether
Lanett was in compliance. The Court granted the motion to enjoin
HEW, noting that rather than terminating funds, HEW should bring
non-compliance to the Court’s attention.197
191. Report of the United States on Amended Desegregation Plans Submitted Pursuant to
the Court’s Decree of March 22, 1967 and Court’s Order of April 24, 1967 at 2, Lee v. Macon Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (Civ. A. No. 604-E).
192. Order Adding Parties Defendant and Order to Show Cause, May 26, 1967 at 1, Lee
(adding these school systems: Marengo County, Linden City, and Thomasville from the Southern
District and Jasper City and Marion County from the Northern District of Alabama).
193. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ, 270 F. Supp. 859, 860 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Only Bibb
County remained non-compliant. Id. at 861.
194. 42 U.S.C. 2000d; Lee at 480.
195. Chambers, Lanett City School Boards Approve Rights Plan: 30-Day Period Given
Students to Make Choice, THE VALLEY TIMES-NEWS, Mar. 30, 1966, at 1.
196. Letter from J.T. Greene, Superintendent, Lanett City Sch. Dist., to Harold B. Williams,
James R. Dunn, Ernest Stone, and Frank M. Johnson, J. (June 30, 1967) (on file with author).
197. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859 (1967).
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DOJ and HEW began jointly reviewing school system compliance
with the court order and not the HEW guidelines.198 Survey teams
created reports for HEW and HEW would then write letters to the
systems with desegregation deficiencies under the court order and the
steps needed to conform to the court order.199
As the process continued, Dr. Stone, the state superintendent
became more involved.200 Particularly after Dr. Stone reported that a
county superintendent entered his office with a non-compliance letter
from HEW that he had not seen before, HEW began sending Dr. Stone
its communications with local superintendents.201 Soon, in the name of
efficiency, the process was revised to directly provide Dr. Stone with the
letters stemming from field surveys by HEW.202
When school opened in the Fall of 1967 the percentage of black
students in Alabama enrolled in white schools had increased from 2.4%
to 6.3% and 871teachers were teaching in faculties in which their race
was in the minority. While far from full desegregation, Alabama had
come a long way from George Wallace’s inaugural promise of
“segregation forever.” After the Supreme Court’s decision in Green v.
County School Board in 1968, holding that school desegregation should
lead to no white schools or black schools but just schools,203 the court
in Lee necessarily turned to more individualized examination of each
school system, to completely eradicate the dual school system. DOJ and
HEW worked closely together, with HEW experts drafting plans
showing how to maximize desegregation in the school district and DOJ
presenting the plans to the court. The result was that, while some onerace schools remained, the schools of Alabama became among the most
racially integrated in the country.204 The Lee case lingered on. There

198. See Memorandum from author to Frank M. Dunbaugh, Att’y for the Southern Section 1
(Oct. 25, 1967) (on file with author).
199. See id.
200. Memorandum from Walter Gorman to Frank M. Dunbaugh, Att’y for the Southern
Section (Jan 29, 1968) (on file with author) (August 2, 1967 decree required Dr. Stone to report
itemized inequalities in the school districts and plans toward eliminating inequalities).
201. “Lee v. Macon – Enforcement of Decree through State Superintendent’s Office”
memorandum from Frank P. Allen, Att’y for the Southern Section, to Frank M. Dunbaugh, Att’y
for the Southern Section (Feb. 5, 1968) (on file with author) (“the first [Dr. Stone] heard about
[the non-compliance letter] was when an irate county superintendent came into his office with the
letter”).
202. “Conference with HEW Officials on Enforcement” memorandum from Frank D. Allen
to Investigation File (Feb. 8, 1968) (on file with author).
203. 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
204. By 1970 36.5% of African-American students in Alabama public schools attended
majority white schools, up from 8.6% two years earlier. Nationwide, 33% attended majority white
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were more efforts of Alabama to thwart desegregation legislatively.
Second generation issues of in-school discrimination, discrimination by
athletic leagues, and discrimination against black faculty and staff
generated more litigation. Eventually the individual school systems
were joined as defendants and sometime later their cases were sent to
the judicial district where they were located.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEE V. MACON COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION
A. Stretching Boundaries of Enforcement
The story of the statewide expansion of Lee v. Macon County Board
of Education took place in a much different era than today’s. The
Warren Court was a far cry from the Roberts Court, and back then the
nation thought of school segregation as a regional problem that needed
a federal solution. The segregation in Alabama had been required by
law, and Brown v. Board of Education required that it end. George
Wallace and Austin Meadows engaged in flagrant interference with
desegregation. Lee nonetheless instructs us about the potential for
federal enforcement of the right to equal educational opportunity
today. Although Lee was a private suit, the government played several
important roles that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers (LDF),
acting alone, would have had difficulty performing. In the early stages
of the case the government stood as an enforcer, ready to deploy
whatever law enforcement assets might be required. In the statewide
phase, the government put together a large trial team to discover
evidence and used HEW experts to show how state surveys could be
used to integrate rather than perpetuate segregation. DOJ monitored
compliance and participated in countless hearings regarding individual
school systems, and HEW, now DOE, developed desegregation plans
where local school systems failed to produce acceptable plans.
Although the government and the civil rights groups did not always
agree on the remedy, overall the groups were glad to have the
government on their side.

schools. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of the Secretary HEW, News for
Release in A.M. Papers, Friday, June 18, 1971. In 1980, 44.3% of black students attended
predominantly white schools, above the national rate of 37.1%. Gary Orfield, Public School
Desegregation in the United States, 1968–1980, 6 (1983), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research
/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/public-school-desegregation-in-the-united-states-19681980/orfield_american-desegregation-1983.pdf.
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The United States’ participation in the case preceded the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The district court and DOJ found a non-statutory
basis for this, enlarging the scope of the well accepted custom of
government acting as amicus curiae. The Civil Rights Act for the first
time gave statutory authority to the Attorney General to bring school
desegregation suits, but only upon receiving a complaint from a parent
that his or her child was denied equal protection of the laws by a school
board.205 Lee enabled DOJ to expand the scope of its work to avoid the
necessity of bringing suits school district by school district.206 The
presence of the United States defeated any possibility that Anthony
Lee’s graduation from high school in 1964 might call into question the
continued justiciability of the case.207 Lee became the precedent for
later DOJ statewide school desegregation cases .208
Lee also demonstrates how HEW/DOE can provide the courts with
expertise needed to resolve public education issues. Not only did the
initial decree draw heavily on the guidelines, but the court also relied
on HEW. HEW monitored compliance and provided alternative plans
for school systems where freedom of choice did not bring about the
required level of desegregation. DOJ and HEW were able to work
together, despite some differences of opinion.209 The DOJ lawyers
became lawyers not only on behalf of the government as Plaintiff but
also on behalf of HEW when its officials were joined as Defendants.
In short, Lee stretched the boundaries of the possible. The flexibility
of equity allowed the court to do many things: join the United States as
an amicus with the rights of a party, join state Defendants who
interfered with desegregation, shape a remedy that initially required
the State Superintendent of Education to act as an agent of the court,
bring in additional parties as needed, ship the cases of individual school
systems to other judicial districts, and to retain jurisdiction until the
dual school system had been eradicated. In essence, the court’s
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a)(i) (2012). The Act also authorized the Attorney General to
intervene in private suits alleging a deprivation of equal protection of the laws based on race. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (2012).
206. See Lamar Alexander to Bryce Harlow, A New School Desegregation Policy, 4
(undated) (on file with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library).
207. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976).
208. See David L. Norman, The Federal Government and the Promise of Brown, 93 YALE L.J.
983, 987 (1984) (“The statewide approach was eventually used in several states, including Texas,
Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina.”).
209. See Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The
Evolution of Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 739, 756 (1980).

LANDSBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

38

10/10/2016 5:55 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:1

enlistment of the Department of Justice enabled it to expand the case
from one involving one small rural school system, to all school systems
in Alabama, not already under court order.
B. Development of Systemic Relief
Lee is notable for the expansiveness of the relief. In Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress for the first time recognized the need
for federal enforcement of Brown. George Wallace’s predecessor as
Governor, John Patterson, had followed a strategy of emphasizing local
rather than state responsibility for schools, as a delaying tactic requiring
plaintiffs to sue one school district at a time,210–and Title IV seemed to
envision a similar approach for DOJ suits. Lee opened the possibility
of suing one state at a time instead of one school district. Though
brought as a private suit, Lee likely would not have grown into a
statewide suit without the Department of Justice. The private Plaintiffs’
attorney, Fred Gray, twice sought statewide relief. In 1964, the
Department of Justice did not support that part of Gray’s prayer for
relief, and it was not granted. In 1966, the court sought the view of the
United States. The government poured significant resources into the
case, resources that the private Plaintiffs lacked, and it filed a brief
strongly supporting statewide relief. The court could rest assured that if
it granted the statewide relief, the government would enforce the
order.211 It is also true that Title VI meant that the resources and fundcutoff powers of HEW could be deployed.
Historically, support for racial equality has waxed and waned in
each branch. Congress forced Reconstruction on a reluctant
President.212 After the Hayes-Tilden Compromise, the three branches
all supported racial segregation, with occasional departures by the
courts and the executive.213 This lasted until the late 1940’s, when the

210. See GENE L. HOWARD, PATTERSON FOR ALABAMA: THE LIFE AND CAREER OF JOHN
PATTERSON 99–100 (2008).
211. BASS, supra note 84, at 233–34 (1993) (quoting Owen Fiss: “Johnson wanted to count on
the government backing him up when the going got tough. . . . Most of the . . . discovery was
always done by the Department of Justice, and I think Johnson always needed to have that
predicate before he did anything tough.”).
212. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 44–49 (Vintage Books 2004)
(1976).
213. See id. at 65; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd.
of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT
LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 21 (Univ. Press of
Kansas 2007).
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Court and the President began to chip away at segregation in
housing,214 the armed forces,215 railroads,216 and higher education.217
Congress refused to confront the issue until 1964, when it came into
accord with the other two branches. Presidential support for school
desegregation fluctuated from the 1970s, depending on which party
held the presidency.218 The court’s support for desegregation gradually
eroded; today, even voluntary measures to ameliorate racial separation
are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.219 When all three branches agreed
on the validity of segregation, practices in the Southern states
effectively separated the races. When all three branches supported
desegregation, public schools in the South became the least segregated
in the country. Today, the Court opposes race conscious efforts to
minimize racial isolation; the executive branch mildly supports those
efforts; Congress is silent on the subject; no one is vigorously pushing
it.
In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, we may trace the
gradual growth of understanding of how to desegregate a school
system.220 When the case was first decided in 1963, the Alabama Pupil
Placement Law essentially placed on black students the burden of
seeking to transfer to a white school.221This was replaced by freedom of
choice, and finally by the Green v. County School Board requirement
that the desegregation plan result in no black schools or white schools,
but just schools. 222 In addition to these student assignment
developments, came growing recognition of the importance of
desegregated faculty, classrooms, transportation, athletic programs, and
other extracurricular activities.223 Then came recognition that
214. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
215. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS : THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 181 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
216. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
217. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
218. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 153, 171 (2001).
219. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
220. 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974).
221. See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 757 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
222. 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). “The detail has grown from a simple order to desegregate, to a
specified form of plan, to a specified plan, to a plan that includes magnet schools, tracking,
transportation, police services and the like.” Aronow, supra note 209, at 758.
223. See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 472–73 (5th Cir. 1974); id. at 473–74
(transportation); id. at 488 (athletics and extracurricular activities); JEANNIE OAKES, TWO
CITIES’ TRACKING AND WITHIN-SCHOOL SEGREGATION, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
THE CHALLENGE FOR TODAY’S SCHOOLS 81–90 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Lamar P. Miller
eds. 1996) (classrooms).
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curriculum should be multicultural,224 and that student discipline must
be fairly applied.225 These lessons emerged over decades of fleshing out
the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education. Brown II had emphasized
the need to “desegregate” and to “admit to public schools on a racially
non-discriminatory basis,”226 but only gradually did the systemic nature
of school segregation become apparent. Indeed, not until 1968 would
the Supreme Court refer to disestablishment of the racially “dual
school system.”227 Perhaps the most dramatic example of the dual
school system was the evidence regarding the state school surveys,
which clearly established that every school district in Alabama was
operating two school systems, one for each race. The school surveys
showed that it was not enough to order admission to schools on a nonracial basis. Because the racial segregation was systemic, the violation
could be cured only by systemic relief.
C. Desegregation and the Future of Equal Educational Opportunity
What does this mean for the future of equal educational
opportunity? The state of federal constitutional law seems stuck in an
unhelpful place. As a matter of policy, desegregation remains as a key
to finally eradicating the effects of the past racial caste system. Equal
opportunity, regardless of race, requires equal education. Where racial
isolation persists, unequal education usually results. The most reliable
path to equal education is desegregation. Although research suggests
that desegregation improves the education of African-Americans
without degrading the education of other students,228 the Supreme
Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, has placed significant barriers to elimination of racial
224. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
225. See Lee, 490 F.2d at 459–61.
226. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
227. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). Lower courts had used the term in six
cases before Lee disestablished the “dual public school system.” See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 478 (M.D. Ala. 1967); United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 852 (5th Cir. 1966), on reh’g, 380 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc); Kemp v.
Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 21 (8th Cir. 1965); Downs v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 1964);
Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1962); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 492
(5th Cir. 1962); Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgar, 255 F.2d 455, 457 n.1 (5th Cir. 1958).
228. See, e.g., Brief of the American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae at
14, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908).
But see The Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Elementary and Secondary Education, U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights 3 (Nov. 2006), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf
(concluding that “[t]here is little evidence that racial and ethnic diversity in elementary and
secondary schools results in significant improvements in academic performance.” A dissent to the
report criticized its methodology and conclusions.).
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isolation229 The executive branch has pushed back, providing a road
map for school districts to navigate through the difficult course set by
that case, which disapproved most race-based programs for combatting
racial isolation in the schools.230 Civil rights advocates need to develop
a multi-pronged strategy.
Strategy should be tied to the objective, which is minimizing racial
isolation. While the Supreme Court has narrowed the paths to equal
educational opportunity, certain paths remain. One path is
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court has
also interpreted the equal protection clause as restricting race-based
student assignments in unitary school system. It has carried that notion
so far in the Louisville case, that the school system was required to
dismantle the system that had been put in place as a remedy for the
dual school system. At the statutory level, the Court has construed Title
VI as forbidding only deliberate race-based discrimination and not
practices that have an adverse racially disparate impact.231 However,
that limitation does not extend to the regulatory level. As in Lee,
achieving the objective may require going beyond existing precedent.
There are several possible approaches to achieving equal
educational opportunity. The most promising approach combines
public and private advocacy.
1. Racially neutral approaches
While the federal government could provide funding, accompanied
by performance standards, to improve schools, that effort thus far has
failed to erase racial disparities.232 School systems could take steps on
their own to end isolation of students in poor socio-economic status.
Congress could use its spending power to encourage school systems to
minimize isolation of students from lower economic strata, but will
most likely continue to defer to the other branches. Advocates of
eliminating racial isolation could wait for changing housing patterns to
bring about desegregation. This could sentence children to racial

229. 551 U.S. 701 (holding the school board’s use of race in order to avoid racial isolation in
schools was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest).
230. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights,
Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in
Elementary and Secondary Schools, U (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/letters/colleague-201111.html [hereinafter Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race].
231. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
232. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
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isolation for years to come, because “even if school segregation
declines at the same rate as residential segregation from this point
forward (by no means a certainty), the resulting progress will be
frustratingly slow.”233
2. Race-based approaches; attacks on racial discrimination
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his separate opinion in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, “In order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race. There is no other way.”234 School
systems could make limited use of race, as outlined by Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Seattle. Whether such efforts would be
upheld will depend on a closely divided Supreme Court taking an
expansive view of permissible measures. As discussed below, a more
promising approach would be for the federal government to apply
disparate impact regulations of DOE to student assignment.235 Just as
the Supreme Court in Brown liberated courts from Plessy, the
executive branch could liberate the courts to confront school board
practices that result in racial isolation.
Going a step further, the federal government could apply the
disparate impact regulations to challenge a state’s maintenance of
virtually one-race school districts.236 It may be possible in some
instances to desegregate schools by bringing housing discrimination
cases. In the Carter Administration the DOJ Civil Rights Division
merged the section responsible for enforcing the fair housing act with
the section responsible for school desegregation enforcement, because
of the inter-relationship of housing and schools. The merged section
brought one case that joined housing and education.237 It may
sometimes be possible for plaintiffs to rely on state rather than federal
law. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law has recently
233. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
64 (forthcoming 2016).
234. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
235. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.3, 100.5 (2016).
236. The DOJ successfully sued under the Fourteenth Amendment to merge the all-black
Kinloch, Missouri school district with neighboring predominantly white districts, thus establishing
state responsibility for the maintenance of segregated school districts. United States v. State of
Mo., 515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see also United States v. State of Tex., 321 F.
Supp. 1043, 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1970), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff’d as
modified, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), and aff’d, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Lee v. Macon
County Board of Education in support of requiring State of Texas to consider merging all-black
school systems with adjoining majority white school systems).
237. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding
trial court order).
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filed a case in North Carolina state court “to challenge the maintenance
of three racially identifiable and inequitably resourced school districts
in Halifax County, North Carolina,” based on the right to education
under the state constitution.238An adverse decision is on appeal.239
It is also still possible to litigate under the Fourteenth Amendment
where it is possible to prove that racial isolation results from deliberate
race-based government decisions. Such showings were made in the
past, and it seems likely that deliberate discrimination still explains
some racial isolation. These cases require considerable resources to
develop the facts, resources that DOJ could deploy again as it did in the
past, in Yonkers, Pasadena, South Holland, Illinois, and Indianapolis.240
Finally, litigants could seek to overturn some or all of the Supreme
Court cases that stopped desegregation dead in its tracks. This last
option probably depends upon a track record of failure of the other
options. Just as Plessy’s overthrow depended upon the accretion of case
law and the development of facts, so also the holdings in cases like
Seattle and Dowell could be eroded over time, concurrent with change
in the composition of the Supreme Court.241
Private litigation in federal court to promote racial desegregation
would most likely have to be based on constitutional violations,242 a
resource-intensive strategy that deserves more attention.243 This paper
addresses the role of the federal government, which may rely on federal
regulations in addition to enforcing constitutional and statutory bans
on race discrimination in public education.
238. Silver et al. v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 15-cvs-767, 2016 WL 1732092 (N.C.
Super Ct. Feb. 2, 2016).
239. The trial court dismissed the complaint on January 28, 2016, and the plaintiffs have
appealed. Id. The Mexican Americal Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) has also relied on a state
disparate impact law. See McFadden v. Bd. of Educ. for Ill. Sch. Dist. U-46, 984 F.Supp.2d 882,
890 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
240. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987); Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); United States v. Sch. Dist., 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D.
Ill. 1968); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974).
241. “A majority of the Supreme Court emerged from the crucible of resistance to Brown and
the civil rights acts of the 1960s. Fortunately, it is a slim and possibly temporary majority.” William
R. Yeomans, The Politics of Civil Rights Enforcement, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 509, 543 (2014).
242. Private plaintiffs may not enforce the disparate impact regulations in a suit under Title
VI. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). But the Tenth Circuit has allowed private
enforcement of the regulations in a Section 1983 suit. See Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187
(10th Cir. 2002), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Kansas v. Robinson, 539 U.S. 936
(2003), despite a circuit split. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 274
F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir.
2003).
243. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 233, at 65–66.
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3. Role of the federal government
In the 1950s and early 1960s, school desegregation confronted
hostile state governments and an indifferent Congress.244 The
Department of Justice sued hundreds of racially segregated school
districts in the 1960s and 1970s.245 Since the 1980s DOJ has changed its
focus; most, if not all, of its activity regarding racial segregation in
public education takes place in pending cases, including Lee v. Macon
Cty. Bd. of Educ., rather than in new cases.246 New desegregation cases
ended when President Carter left office over thirty years ago; from
President Reagan to President Obama, the work of the Civil Rights
Division’s Educational Opportunities Section has focused on disability
and sex discrimination, race discrimination in student discipline, and
occasional segregation issues in pending cases.247 A speech drafted for
the first Associate Attorney General in the Clinton Administration to
give to a branch of the NAACP LDF paints the picture:
The Administration will continue to revive the Educational
Opportunities Section, allowing it to monitor more closely the
progress of school desegregation. The Department will pay closer
attention to determinations that a school district has achieved
unitary status, and in increased coordination with the Office of Civil
Rights at the Department of Education, we will aggressively
challenge those determinations with which we disagree. School
districts will only be able to escape court supervision when they
have demonstrated that vestiges of prior discrimination have been
eliminated in all critical areas of their schools’ operation.248

Conspicuously absent is any mention of bringing new school
desegregation cases. DOJ filed briefs in Seattle and Louisville arguing
that the desegregation plans in those cases were unconstitutional quota
244. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 41–55 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1971) (1961).
245. Annual Report of the Attorney General, 68 (1973) (noting that Education Section
involved in over 230 school desegregation cases involving over 540 school districts).
246. See Dep’t of Justice, Educational Opportunities Cases, https://www.justice.gov/crt/
educational-opportunities-cases#race (last updated July 27, 2016) (list of actions in pending CRD
race discrimination cases involving schools).
247. See Becoming Less Separate?, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that since FY 1991 the DOJ
“has not initiated any new traditional desegregation lawsuits and has indicated that they are not
aware of any such federal suits being instituted by other parties”).
248. Webb Hubbell, Address Before the New England Committee of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (Oct. 21, 1993); see also Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division,
2 HARV. L. & POLICY REV. 211, 226–27, 233 (2008) (pointing out that under President George
W. Bush, CRD was “not a principal player in efforts to desegregate school systems.” CRD should
“take a leadership role in formulating effective approaches and strategies to promote integration
in light of” Seattle and Louisville decisions).
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plans, while seeming to anticipate Justice Kennedy’s concurring
thoughts that strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact.249
Today, the challenge may seem greater than it was in the 1960s and
70s: a Supreme Court hostile to race-based remedies, an indifferent
Congress, and passive executive. The executive branch under the
Obama administration sympathizes with the need for educational
equality, including the need to minimize racial isolation. It continues to
litigate a few ancient desegregation cases, and it has released guidelines
for voluntary desegregation of public schools within the narrow
framework of the Seattle and Louisville cases.250 The NAACP LDF,
which created the road to Brown and was at the forefront of
implementation of Brown, now lists its educational priorities as:
“increase equity in education by increasing graduation rates (K-12 and
college) among African-Americans, foster adoption of racially
equitable and research-based approaches to school discipline.”251 LDF
did release a manual in 2008 explaining how school districts could
voluntarily integrate despite the Seattle and Louisville cases.252
School boards are unlikely to pursue voluntary race-based steps in
today’s climate; their lawyers will point to the Supreme Court cases and
advise that race-based steps are risky. Moreover, history has shown that
entrenched privilege finds it difficult to take voluntary steps to widen
opportunity. Future steps, whether in litigation or voluntary, must be
grounded on facts and legal theory showing government complicity in
racial separation in public schools, just as the attack on Plessy was based
on facts and legal theory showing the impossibility of running schools
that were both separate and equal. These are arguments that civil rights
groups could be addressing to all three branches of the federal
government. They could push school boards to test the limits of the
Seattle decision, looking to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence for

249. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908) [hereinafter
United States’ Parents Involved Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 12, Meredith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., (No. CIV.A. 3:02CV-620-H), 2007 WL
3342258, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2007).
250. See Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race, supra note 230.
251. Who We Are, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/about-ldf (last visited Sept. 2,
2015).
252. Still Looking to the Future: Voluntary K-12 School Integration, NAACPLDF,
http://www.naacpldf.org/document/still-looking-future-voluntary-k-12-school-integration (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015).
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guidance.253 However, if they want to pursue desegregation, they will
need to consider the litigation and fund cut-off options, if all else fails.254
The DOJ and DOE in the 1960s and 1970s followed a proactive
approach, without waiting for parents to complain that their children’s
school system was unlawfully segregated. After Congress rejected
Attorney General authority to bring equal protection cases in 1957 and
1960, DOJ sued segregated school districts receiving federal impact aid
based on the number of children who were dependents of federal
employees.255 Although Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposed
a complaint prerequisite to DOJ suits, the DOJ of the 1970s relied on
state-wide litigation to finesse the need to proceed school district by
school district. Similarly, HEW’s enforcement of Title VI did not rely
on complaints from parents. Moreover, DOJ and HEW collaborated on
a joint strategy. Undoubtedly, the priority that these agencies gave to
school desegregation came in part from pressure from civil rights
organizations. While the politics of race are beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth noting that at a recent conference at Duke Law
School the former director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
expressed the opinion that it would be futile to ask DOJ and HEW to
pursue a disparate impact test in school desegregation suits, as
suggested below.256
Lee can be looked to as an example of a productive relationship
between the private civil rights bar and the federal government, which
found avenues of federal action to end segregation statewide, even
when there was no precedent for this. This shows that each branch of
government can play a role in eliminating the racial caste system and
its effects, sometimes acting independently and sometimes in concert
with other branches. It also shows how digging deep into the facts to
prove what may seem obvious can concretize a violation in a way that
generalities, even if they are obvious, cannot. If racial discrimination
explains the persistence of racial isolation it should be possible, though
undoubtedly difficult, to prove.257
253. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
254. Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2013) is an example of a case where the court
found student assignment policies did not violate the equal protection clause, but application of
a disparate impact standard might have led to a different result.
255. See United States v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 929 (1964); see generally United States v. Cty. School Bd. of Prince George Cty., 221 F.
Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963).
256. Oral Response of Theodore Shaw to this paper at Duke Law School conference,
November 20-21, 2015.
257. As this article was being finalized the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a
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In the innovative spirit of Lee, the U.S. should consider the
suggestion of Kimberly Jenkins Robinson that DOE apply its disparate
impact regulations to practices that result in racial isolation in
schools.258 Her suggestion finds support in the opinion of Justice Powell,
concurring in part in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado:259
I concur in the Court’s position that the public school authorities
are the responsible agency of the State, and that, if the affirmative
duty doctrine is sound constitutional law for Charlotte, it is equally
so for Denver. I would not, however, perpetuate the de jure/de facto
distinction, nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort
of identifying “segregative acts” and deducing “segregative intent.”
I would hold, quite simply, that, where segregated public schools
exist within a school district to a substantial degree, there is a prima
facie case that the duly constituted public authorities . . . are
sufficiently responsible to warrant imposing upon them a nationally
applicable burden to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating a
genuinely integrated school system.

While the Court rejected Powell’s formulation of school district
obligations under the equal protection clause, DOE has room to adopt
Powell’s formulation under Title VI. The Court has assumed that DOE
may impose disparate impact regulations on recipients of federal
financial assistance.260 Where schools are racially isolated, it is always
possible to point to school board policies that cause the racial isolation:
policies relating to school construction, grade structure, and student
assignment. While the Seattle and Louisville cases, fairly read, would
prevent DOE from requiring racial balance, they do not prevent DOE
from adopting an approach like Justice Powell’s: imposing an
affirmative obligation on school systems to take steps to avoid racial
isolation.
Applying disparate impact analysis in light of Justice Powell’s
suggestion above, DOE could create a presumption against a school
system’s choice to assign students in a way that would lead to racial

report reflecting growing racial segregation in the nation’s schools. Neither the GAO nor DOE
or DOJ suggested that the report should lead to greater scrutiny to determine whether the
segregation is the result of racial discrimination. Instead, they focused on other forms of
discrimination. See General Accounting Office, K-12 Education: Better Use of Information Could
Help Agencies Identify Disparities and Address Racial Discrimination (April 2016).
258. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding and
Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787,
862–68 (2010).
259. 413 U.S. 189, 224 (1973).
260. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
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isolation, where non-isolating steps are available. This choice should be
allowed only if the school system can show the educational need for it.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in the Seattle and Louisville cases
can be read to allow school systems (and, by extension, DOE) to ensure
“all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”261 The
Court endorsed that Kennedy concurring opinion in a fair housing case
this past term.262 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in that case
graphically portrays the stakes: “The FHA must play an important part
in avoiding the Kerner Commission’s grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur Nation
is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.’”
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) support the power of DOE to
require more than the Constitution requires. Although Title IV restricts
the Attorney General’s power to require “assignment of students to
public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance” in suits to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI only requires that there
be one uniform policy for de jure segregation throughout the United
States and one uniform policy for de facto segregation.263 In any event,
the effects test would not require assignment of students to overcome
racial imbalance, but would simply require the school district to explain
why it adopted policies that led to the imbalance.
The 1974 statute was an anti-busing law. It constitutes Congress’s
first and only effort to define equal educational opportunity without
regard to race, color, sex, or national origin. While the EEOA forbids
race-based assignment of students to schools that result in increased
segregation, it does not forbid consideration of race to reduce racial
isolation.264 Arguably the EEOA may apply to DOE action under Title
VI, though that is not completely clear. The EEOA defines both equal
educational opportunity and denial of equal protection, and it provides
that in devising a remedy for either, “a court, department, or agency of
the United States shall seek or impose only such remedies as are
essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity

261. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 708 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
262. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2525 (2015) (citation omitted) (“race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a
proper fashion”).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6, 2000d-6 (2012).
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c), (e) (2012).
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or equal protection of the laws.”265 DOE is a department of the United
States, but other language in the EEOA suggests that it is a selfcontained law, with little overlap with Title VI. The law declares the
neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining school
assignment, and says that the purpose of the EEOA is “to specify
appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual
school system.”266 The findings and remedial sections stress the harm of
excessive busing and limit the amount of busing that can be required.267
The DOE regulation provides that a recipient of federal financial
assistance may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin.” The regulation includes as an example the determination of
where to build a school: the recipient “may not make selections with
the effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of,
or subjecting them to discrimination under any programs to which this
regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or national origin; or
with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the
accomplishment of the objectives of the Act or this regulation.”268 In
addition, “[e]ven though an applicant or recipient has never used
discriminatory policies, the services and benefits of the program or
activity it administers may not in fact be equally available to some
racial or nationality groups. In such circumstances, an applicant or
recipient may properly give special consideration to race, color, or
national origin to make the benefits of its program more widely
available to such groups, not then being adequately served.”269
However, it is not clear that DOE still pursues cases of racial isolation
in assignment to school. The DOE website on its race discrimination
policies includes this Q and A:
Q. What types of cases does OCR handle?

265. 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1714 (also referring to “any court,
department or agency of the United States”).
266. 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).
267. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1713, 1714 (2012).
268. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2016).
269. 34 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2016).
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A. OCR handles cases of discrimination in issues such as discipline,
racial harassment, and denial of language services to national origin
minority students who are English language learners.270

A Clinton Administration statement on Title VI mainly discusses
in-school discrimination issues. Its treatment of student assignment is
limited to this:
“School districts may not segregate students on the basis of race,
color, or national origin in assigning students to schools. In some
areas, the population distribution of a school district enrolling large
numbers of minority and nonminority students may result in schools
with substantially disproportionate enrollments of students of one
race. Although school districts must ensure that students are not
assigned on the basis of race, color, or national origin, the law does
not require that each school within a district have a racially balanced
student population.”271

An OCR report issued in May 2016 reflects that race discrimination
accounts for only 21% of the complaints received.272 The section of the
Report that addresses compliance with Title VI does not list a single
desegregation investigation. Instead the Report discusses actions OCR
has taken respecting racial harassment, access to courses,
discriminatory discipline, retaliation, and the education of English
learners.273 These are the topics that yielded the most complaints
received. OCR’s staff has been cut in half since 1980, while the number
of complaints has increased twenty-fold, so that it may now be
impractical for OCR to investigate racial segregation even though it
has the statistical evidence that segregation persists.274
The working assumption of this paper is that the social science is
correct in finding that education is better where schools are racially
integrated. If so, the current passive and reactive stance of civil rights
organizations and the federal executive will not bring about equal
educational opportunity. Still, a mixture of private and public advocacy
could lead to change. First, the creation of voluntary guidelines by the
270. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Race
Discrimination, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/qa-race.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2015).
271. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Student Assignment in Elementary and
Secondary (Revised Sept. 1998), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tviassgn.html.
272. Catherine E. Lhamon, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Delivering Justice 8
(May 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-and-secretary-ofeducation-2015.pdf.
273. Id. at 18–25.
274. Id. at 8.
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government and the LDF will have little if any effect unless it is
accompanied by grass roots pressure on local school boards. Civil rights
organizations will need to choose strategically which school boards are
most likely to respond to citizen pressure to do more. Second, civil
rights organizations will need to pressure DOE and DOJ to enforce the
disparate impact standard where school board policies lead to racial
isolation. They cannot realistically expect the federal government to
make school desegregation a priority if the civil rights community is
viewed as placing little importance on desegregation. Third, DOE could
issue guidance explaining that the disparate impact regulation
incorporates Justice Powell’s approach in Keyes.
One obvious flaw with reliance on the executive branch is that its
position depends on a mixture of law and policy. Starting with President
Reagan and continuing under Presidents Bush, the executive branch
has rigidly opposed race based measures to combat racial isolation. For
example, the Solicitor General’s brief in the Seattle case, while seeming
to acknowledge the desirability of lessening isolation of minority
students, argued that the Seattle plan failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny
standard that applies to governmental decisions based on race.275
However, under President Obama the executive once again supports
race based measures to combat racial isolation in public schools. The
joint DOJ-DOE statement, reads the Seattle decision as still allowing
some room for race-based decisions.276
Some of the most extreme racial isolation occurs in large urban
school districts. For example, in San Antonio Independent School
District less than 2% of the students are white.277 The existence of large
school districts with miniscule white enrollments will not initially be
cured by this approach, given the Supreme Court’s resistance to
requiring suburban districts to participate in city desegregation plans278
The logic of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, though, could in
time lead to extension of the disparate impact test across school district
lines, because it is state law that establishes school district lines.

275. United States’ Parents Involved Brief, supra note 249, at 18.
276. Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race, supra note 230.
277. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 650 n.98 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 2888, 192 L. Ed. 2d 923 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
278. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
DOE’s focus these days has been on improving the No Child Left
Behind Law, successor to the 1965 Elementary and Secondary
Education Act.279 The Secretary of Education, while noting progress in
equal opportunity under NCLB, also has pointed out remaining
problems in the education of black and Hispanic students, such as dropout rates and discipline rates. His speech does not mention segregation,
but presents this startling fact: “a third of black students attend high
schools that don’t even offer calculus.”280 As the LDF’s attack on
segregation in Brown showed, separate schools are not equal schools;
to deny black students the right to take calculus is to deny them an
equal education. In January 1951, an African American mother asked
the Macon County School Superintendent to either provide her son at
the black high school in Tuskegee a geometry course or allow him to
take that one course at the nearby all-white Tuskegee High School.281
That request was an early salvo in the effort of Macon County AfricanAmericans to get an equal education. It seems apparent that there is
unlikely to be equal educational opportunity so long as there are
racially isolated schools in multi-racial areas.
Owen Fiss saw in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education
“something as ingenious, as path-breaking, as innovative as something
like Marbury v. Madison.”282 Supporters of equal educational
opportunity need to find an equally innovative path forward today. The
carrot of federal funding has failed to bring equality. It is time for civil
rights organizations and DOJ and DOE to renew legal efforts to
overcome racial isolation in the schools.

279. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012).
280. Arne Duncan, U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., America’s Educational Crossroads: Making the Right
Choice for Our Children’s Future, (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/americaseducational-crossroads-making-right-choice-our-children%E2%80%99s-future; see also Gary
Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for New
Integration Strategies, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 5 (Aug. 2007), https://civilrightsproject.
ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-acceleratingresegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversalsaccelerating.pdf (“From the ‘excellence’ reforms of the Reagan era and the Goals 2000 project of
the Clinton Administration to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, we have been trying to focus
pressure and resources on making the achievement of minority children in segregated schools
equal. The record to date justifies deep skepticism.”).
281. Dan Cobb, Macon Negroes Demand Equal School Rights, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 10,
1951.
282. BASS, supra note 84, at 235.

